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1  | INTRODUCING A TENSION BET WEEN 
AN ETHIC OF COHESION AND SOCIAL 
DISTANCING
Many philosophers in the African tradition are fundamentally rela-
tional in their understanding of morality, maintaining that it involves 
community in some non-instrumental way. For these thinkers, com-
munity is not a mere means to something else, but is instead roughly 
a moral end to be pursued for its own sake. Furthermore, even those 
African philosophers who think otherwise, directing us to promote 
the common good1 or life-force,2 tend to hold that communitarian-
ism is an essential or at least reliable means to such an end. Although 
I raise a puzzle in the first instance for the fundamentally relational 
approach, it applies with comparable force to the view that commu-
nity is a crucial means to meeting the needs of all or fostering their 
vitality.
For just a few characterizations of community, whether as an 
end or a means, consider the following statements about African 
ethics. Two moral education scholars sum up John Mbiti’s classic 
interpretation of sub-Saharan worldviews with: “What is right is 
what connects people together; what separates people is 
wrong”.3 A former South African Constitutional Court Justice 
analysing ubuntu, the Nguni word for humanness often used to 
capture morality, places harmonious relationship at its core and 
remarks, “Harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic 
 1Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African 
Experience. New York: Oxford University Press, 35-76; Gyekye, K. (2010). African Ethics. 
In Zalta, E. (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from 
https://plato.stanf ord.edu/entri es/afric an-ethic s/#NotCo mGoo
 2Magesa, L. (1997). African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life. Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis; Bujo, B. (2001). Foundations of an African Ethic. New York: Crossroad Publishers.
 3Verhoef, H. & Michel, C. (1997). Studying Morality within the African Context. Journal of 
Moral Education, 26, 397.
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social relations within the group”.4 One of the influential 
Ghanaian moral-political philosophers speaks approvingly of 
communitarianism as what “advocates a life lived in harmony 
and cooperation with others….a life in which one shares in the 
fate of the other”.5 A Kenyan historian of African philosophy 
says of ethical thought, “A life of cohesion, or positive integra-
tion with others, becomes a goal…Let us call this goal communal-
ism”.6 Finally, a Zimbabwean political philosopher places 
community at the heart of unhu (the Shona word for humanness), 
and defines it as “coming together to form a common way of 
living together”.7
Notice the phrasings: “what connects people”; “close social rela-
tions”; “a life that shares the other’s fate”; “cohesion”; “integration 
with others”; “coming together”; “living together”. These terms are 
plainly read as ascribing moral value to people cooperatively partici-
pating in projects with each other and doing so in person. That is 
what one would expect from an ethical perspective that grew princi-
pally out of small-scale societies and extended families. It is also 
what plausibly explains practices recurrent amongst indigenous 
African peoples such as: resolving conflicts by everyone sitting 
under the proverbial tree and seeking consensus; working collec-
tively, e.g., with all those who had harvesting to do moving together 
from plot to plot, instead of leaving the work to be done on a given 
plot to those who lived there; and according moral importance to 
rituals and customs such as singing, drumming, and dancing.8 
Furthermore, isolation from others was often viewed with suspicion 
by “traditional” sub-Saharan societies, with just one proverb (from 
the Kom people in Cameroon) saying that “aloofness is good only for 
a witch”.9
The question I address in this article is what such a communal 
value system entails for the coronavirus pandemic and, specifi-
cally, for a practice of what is widely labelled “social distancing”. As 
is well known, it appears that essential for slowing the spread of 
SARS-CoV-2, a highly infectious virus that causes the COVID-19 
disease of severely impaired lung function, is for people to dis-
tance themselves from others, staying home as much as possible. 
Still more, people are to stay at least two metres away from one 
another, whether inside or outside the home. Italy and South 
Africa, for just two examples, had banned even outdoor bicycle 
riding and jogging as an extreme enforcement of social 
distancing.10
On the face of it, a call to be close, to live a life of cohesion, or to 
move towards each other forbids a decision to remove oneself from 
society, particularly from one’s family. Now, does it? Does the best 
interpretation of communalism prohibit a person from disengaging 
from others, despite the serious risks to one’s health or that of oth-
ers? Or does it entail that social distancing is wrong to some degree, 
although morally permissible on balance? Or could it instead mean 
that social distancing is not wrong to any degree and could, under 
certain circumstances, be precisely the right way to value communal 
relationship?
In this article, I mainly defend the latter view. I argue that, 
given an independently attractive understanding of how to value 
communal relationship, distancing oneself from others when nec-
essary to protect them from serious incapacitation or harm can 
come at no cost to right action. However, I do contend that, given 
an African moral-philosophical context, it is difficult to avoid the 
implication that one would be doing wrong to avoid others out of 
self-interest, and I also discuss some cases in which social distanc-
ing evinces a lack of good character, despite being the right thing 
to do.
I do not empirically recount much about SARS-CoV-2 and its 
spread across the world. I merely note here that it is a respiratory 
virus that spreads quickly and easily from both symptomatic and 
asymptomatic carriers, requires intensive care with the use of a 
ventilator in about a fifth of the cases, has at the time of writing 
infected more than 4,000,000 people around the world and 
caused more than 275,000 deaths, and, for all we can tell, can re-
alistically be stopped in the short-term only by social 
distancing.11
Downplaying descriptive issues in favour of prescriptive ones, 
in the following I begin by advancing a moral principle that is 
grounded on values and norms salient amongst indigenous sub-Sa-
haran peoples, according to which morality is roughly a matter of 
prizing communal relationships. I lack the space to defend this ethic 
thoroughly, though I expect it will be found prima facie attractive 
by at least a sub-Saharan readership, if not by those in the Global 
South more broadly.12 Next, I apply the Afro-communal principle to 
social distancing, and argue that, despite initial appearances, the 
 4Mokgoro, Y. (1998). Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal, 1, 17.
 5Gyekye, op. cit. note 1, 1997, 75-76.
 6Masolo, D.A. (2010). Self and Community in a Changing World. Bloomington: University 
of Indiana Press, 240.
 7Masitera, E. (2020). Indigenous African Ethics and Land Distribution. South African 
Journal of Philosophy, 39, 38.
 8So I have argued in, amongst other places, Metz, T. (2017). Toward an African Moral 
Theory (Revised Edition). In Ukpokolo, I. (Ed.), Themes, Issues and Problems in African 
Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 97-119.
 9Tosam, M.J. (2014). The Philosophical Foundations of Kom Proverbs. Journal on African 
Philosophy, 9, 12.
 10Balmer, C. & Jones, G. (2020, March 20). Italy Tightens Lockdown Screw Further as 
Coronavirus Deaths Rocket. Reuters. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://www.reute 
rs.com/artic le/us-healt h-coron aviru s-italy /joggi ng-park-walks -banne d-as-alarm ed-itali 
an-regio ns-impos e-more-coron aviru s-restr ictio ns-idUSK BN2172BN; South African 
Government News Agency (2020, March 25). Mkhize Clarifies No Jogging, Dog-walking 
during Lockdown. SAnews.gov.za. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://www.sanews.
gov.za/south -afric a/mkhiz e-clari fies-no-joggi ng-dog-walki ng-durin g-lockdown
 11Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2020). Coronavirus (COVID-19). 
Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://www.cdc.gov/coron aviru s/2019-ncov/index.
html; World Health Organization. (2020). Coronavirus. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from 
https://www.who.int/healt h-topic s/coron avirus; Worldometer (2020). Coronavirus 
Cases. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://www.world omete rs.info/coron aviru s/
 12Harmony, construed in various ways, is also prominent in indigenous East Asian and 
South American moral thought, such that, for those beyond the West, it is arguably the 
“mother of all values”, in the words of Bell, D.A. & Mo, Y. (2014). Harmony in the World 
2013: The Ideal and the Reality. Social Indicators Research, 118, 797-818.
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principle can entail that one would do no wrong to avoid others if 
done for their sake (other times it entails that one would do merely 
a pro tanto wrong that is on balance justified). However, I point out 
that a likely implication of the principle is that one would do wrong 
to avoid others for one’s own sake, an outcome that is shared by the 
other prominent African moral philosophies. In addition, it might be 
that, when it comes to good character as distinct from right action, 
one would have grounds to regret not being as virtuous as one 
could have been, even if one avoids others for their sake. I conclude 
by drawing out some broader implications of the discussion, per-
haps surprisingly for the way we ought to interact with animals in 
the wild.
2  | AN AFRO - COMMUNAL ETHIC
There are of course a number of different ways that community or 
communal relationship has been conceived by African philosophers. 
It will not do to pick an idiosyncratic or unattractive understanding 
of it and then show that it is consistent with social distancing. 
Instead, in order genuinely to resolve the tension between an Afro-
communal ethic and a practice of social distancing, one should show 
that the ethic is both representative of the African tradition and is on 
the face of it philosophically powerful.13
I advance an Afro-communal ethic in the context of maxims ubiq-
uitously taken to capture indigenous or “traditional” sub-Saharan 
morality, namely, “I am because we are” and “A person is a person 
through other persons”. Although these phrases are sometimes used 
to express a metaphysical claim (viz., that one could not have be-
come who one is without having lived in a certain society), they are 
also routinely meant to express a moral one. In particular, they are 
often prescriptions to become a real self or a complete person,14 or, 
in the influential southern African vernacular, they are exhortations 
to exhibit ubuntu.15
Such an ethic is a eudaimonist or self-realization perspective, sim-
ilar to the foundations of Aristotelianism and Confucianism. The ulti-
mate answer to the question of why one should live one way rather 
than another is the fact that it would make one a better person. 
There is a distinctively human and higher part of our nature, and a 
lower, animal self, and both can be realized to various degrees. That 
is, the thought is that one can be more or less of a human, person, or 
self, and one’s basic aim in life should be to develop one’s human-
ness, personhood, or selfhood as much as one can. Indeed, it is 
common for those from indigenous African cultures to describe 
those who are wicked as “not persons”, “zero-persons”, or even “ani-
mals”, while nonetheless continuing to recognize them as having a 
full moral status or dignity.16
Turning to the second part of the maxims, one becomes a real 
self “because we are” or a complete person “through other persons”, 
which roughly means insofar as one prizes communal or harmonious 
relationships with others. As Augustine Shutte remarks of an ubuntu 
ethic as often understood in southern Africa, “Our deepest moral 
obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering 
more and more deeply into community with others. So although the 
goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded”.17
It is common for ethicists working in the African tradition to 
maintain, or at least to suggest, that the only comprehensive respect 
in which one can exhibit human excellence is by relating to others 
communally or harmoniously, normally as an end (but, as noted 
above, possibly as a means to some other value such as the common 
good or life-force). Peter Kasenene, a Ugandan theologian who has 
studied African morality, remarks that “in African societies, immoral-
ity is the word or deed which undermines fellowship”,18 while 
Desmond Tutu, the renowned South African thinker, says of sub-Sa-
haran peoples, “Social harmony is for us the summum bonum––the 
greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-af-
ter good is to be avoided like the plague”.19 Such an ethic manifestly 
differs from the most salient philosophical approaches to morally 
right action in the contemporary West, which appeal at bottom to 
utility promotion, respect for autonomy, agreement in a social con-
tract, or God’s will.20
The next question is how one is to understand community, fel-
lowship, or harmony. I quote representative African theorists about 
what it means to live in community, harmony, etc., after which I draw 
on their comments to advance a principle to guide thought about 
bioethical matters, including controversies regarding how to respond 
to the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to the above construal of 
harmony in terms of “close and sympathetic social relations”, con-
sider the following statements:
“Every member is expected to consider him/herself 
an integral part of the whole and to play an appropri-
ate role towards achieving the good of all”, says the 
moral philosopher Segun Gbadegesin of his Yoruba 
people in Nigeria.21
 13Much of the following articulation of an Afro-communal ethic borrows from Metz, T. 
(2018). How to Deal with Neglected Tropical Diseases in the Light of an African Ethic. 
Developing World Bioethics, 18, 234-236. What is new here is not the ethic, but rather 
reflection on its implications for social distancing, which are not obvious.
 14Wiredu, K. (1992). The African Concept of Personhood. In Flack, H. & Pellegrino, E. 
(Eds), African-American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 104-117; Menkiti, I. (2004). On the Normative Conception of a Person. 
In Wiredu, K. (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 324-331.
 15Mokgoro, op. cit. note 4; Tutu, D. (1999). No Future without Forgiveness. New York: 
Random House, 34-35. For a survey of how several sub-Saharan peoples understand 
these maxims, see Nkulu-N’Sengha, M. (2009). Bumuntu. In Asante, M.K. & Mazama, A. 
(Eds), Encyclopedia of African Religion. Los Angeles: Sage, 142-147.
 16See, e.g., Wiredu, K. (1992). Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In Wiredu, K. & 
Gyekye, K. (Eds), Person and Community; Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, Volume I. 
Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 199-200; Gyekye, 
op. cit. note 1, 1997, 49-51; and Nkulu-N’Sengha, ibid, 144.
 17Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu: An Ethic for the New South Africa. Cape Town: Cluster 
Publications, 30.
 18Kasenene, P. (1998). Religious Ethics in Africa. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 21.
 19Tutu, op. cit. note 15, 35.
 20For contrasts with the ethic of care, see Metz, T. (2013). The Western Ethic of Care or 
an Afro-Communitarian Ethic? Journal of Global Ethics, 9, 77-92.
 21Gbadegesin, S. (1991). African Philosophy. New York: Peter Lang, 65.
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Tutu notes of African peoples, “We say, ‘A person is a 
person through other persons.’ It is not, ‘I think there-
fore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human because I be-
long. I participate, I share’”.22
“The fundamental meaning of community is the shar-
ing of an overall way of life, inspired by the notion of 
the common good”, an analysis from the most influen-
tial African political philosopher of the past 20 years, 
the Ghanaian Kwame Gyekye.23
“(T)he purpose of our life is community-service and 
community-belongingness”, pithily remarks Pantaleon 
Iroegbu, an Igbo theologian from Nigeria.24
“If you asked ubuntu advocates and philosophers: 
What principles inform and organise your life?....the 
answers would express commitment to the good of 
the community in which their identities were formed, 
and a need to experience their lives as bound up in 
that of their community”, writes Gessler Muxe 
Nkondo, a South African policy analyst.25
What is striking about these several characterizations of how to 
commune, harmonize, or otherwise become a real person is that two 
distinct relational goods are repeatedly mentioned. On the one hand, 
there is being close, considering oneself part of the whole, partici-
pating, sharing a way of life, belonging, and experiencing oneself as 
bound up with others. On the other hand, there is being sympathetic, 
achieving the good of all, sharing, acting for the common good, serving 
the community, and being committed to the good of one’s society.
Elsewhere I have worked to distinguish and reconstruct these 
two facets of a communal relationship with some precision, con-
tending that each has a different logic and implications for moral-
ity.26 For an overview, consider Figure 1:
It is revealing to understand what I call the relationship of “iden-
tifying” with others or “sharing a way of life” with them (i.e., being 
close, belonging, etc.) to be the combination of exhibiting certain 
psychological attitudes of cohesion and cooperative behaviour con-
sequent to them. The attitudes include a tendency to think of one-
self as in relation with the other and to refer to oneself as a “we” 
(rather than an “I”) and a disposition to feel pride or shame in what 
the other or one’s group does. The cooperative behaviours include 
being transparent about the terms of interaction, allowing others to 
make voluntary choices, acting on the basis of trust, and, at the ex-
treme end, choosing for the reason that “this is who we are”.
What I label the relationship of “exhibiting solidarity” with or 
“caring” for others (i.e., acting for other people’s good, etc.) is sim-
ilarly construed as the combination of exhibiting certain psycholog-
ical attitudes and engaging in helpful behaviour. Here, the attitudes 
are ones positively oriented towards the other’s good and include 
an empathetic awareness of the other’s condition and a sympathetic 
emotional reaction to this awareness. The actions are not merely 
those likely to be beneficial, that is, to improve the other’s state, but 
also are ones done consequent to certain motives, say, for the sake 
of making the other better off or even a better person.
In principle and in practice, these two ways of relating can come 
apart. Making an anonymous donation to an overseas charity pre-
sumably involves solidarity with the beneficiaries, but little identity 
with them. Conversely, workers and managers in a firm might iden-
tify with each other, but solidarity between them is often low––after 
all, workers usually do not do their jobs out of sympathy with manag-
ers or for their sake. Although identity and solidarity are separable, 
morally speaking it is best when they are manifested at the same 
 22Tutu, op. cit. note 15, 35.
 23Gyekye, K. (2004). Beyond Cultures; Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, Volume III. 
Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 16.
 24Iroegbu, P. (2005). Beginning, Purpose and End of Life. In Iroegbu, P. & Echekwube, A. 
(Eds), Kpim of Morality Ethics. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 442.
 25Nkondo, G.M. (2007). Ubuntu as a Public Policy in South Africa. International Journal of 
African Renaissance Studies, 2, 91.  26E.g., in Metz, op. cit. notes 8 and 20.
F I G U R E  1   (Schematic representation 
of communal relationship)
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time, a combination that captures, e.g., the nature of collegiality in 
an academic department.
Bringing things together, here are some concrete and explicit 
principled interpretations of “I am because we are” and “A person 
is a person through other persons”: one should strive to become a 
real self, which is matter of one’s actions and attitudes prizing those 
capable of identity and solidarity. Or, one ought to develop person-
hood, which means honouring people in virtue of their dignified abil-
ity to be party to communal relationships of sharing a way of life and 
caring for others’ quality of life.
Conversely, one lacking in human excellence, or who is “not a 
person”, would be one who fails to respect those able to commune. 
Substantial vice or wrongdoing by this ethic consists of prizing the 
opposite, discordant relationships of acting on an “us versus them” 
attitude with regard to innocent parties, subordinating them, harm-
ing them, and doing so out of cruelty. In addition, simply alienating 
oneself by failing to participate and being indifferent towards the 
good of others are also wrong, even if one does not actively suppress 
or injure.
To “honour” or “prize” communal relationship, or those capable 
of it, is a deontological notion, and so is to be contrasted with a con-
sequentialist prescription merely to promote it as much as one can, 
and wherever one can, in the long run. For example, one should give 
some priority to the communal relationships of which one is already 
a part, instead of cutting them off whenever doing so would foster 
marginally more communion on the part of others. Ceteris paribus, 
the stronger and longer one’s communal ties with others, the more 
of an obligation to help them. This interpretation of partiality is 
meant to reconstruct philosophically the traditional practice of pri-
oritizing aid to blood relations.27
However, partiality is not meant to be absolute, and the urgent 
needs of strangers, who also matter for their own sake by virtue of 
being capable of communal relationship, merit consideration and 
must be weighed up against the interests of intimates. The idea that 
every person has a dignity is also prominent in the African tradi-
tion,28 and is accounted for here in terms of an individual’s natural 
ability to be communed with and to commune.
This analysis should be enough to meet the two desiderata for 
a communal ethic, namely, of being African and plausible. In terms 
of the former, beyond capturing both the partiality and dignity in 
characteristically African moral thought, the above ethic can also 
make good sense of the salient African practices mentioned above 
(in section 1).29 In particular, the extended family is the exemplar 
of communal relationship, the quintessential instance of enjoying 
a sense of togetherness, participating cooperatively, aiding one 
another, and sympathetically doing so for one another’s sake. Such 
a way of relating also accounts well for consensus-seeking in the 
face of disagreement or conflict; the interests of all are most likely 
to be met if everyone assents, while unanimous agreement would 
plausibly manifest the most intense sense of togetherness and co-
operation possible for a distribution of political power. Collective 
harvesting would obviously be good for others while fostering a 
sense of togetherness and being cooperative. And, then, singing, 
dancing, and similar kinds of customs are neatly captured by com-
munion, too.
Insofar as those practices are prima facie morally desirable, the 
Afro-communal ethic is philosophically attractive for explaining what 
makes them so. In addition, when focusing on bioethical matters, the 
ethic does a reasonable job of accommodating widely shared intu-
itions.30 For example, whereas utilitarianism accounts for the wrong-
ness of violating informed consent by the long-term damage to trust 
and consequently health, and Kantianism accounts for it in terms of 
impaired autonomy, for the Afro-communal ethic violating informed 
consent is wrong because it is a failure to share a way of life. Forcing or 
tricking someone into undergoing medical treatment or being part of a 
medical study flouts the value of cooperation. Consider another bio-
ethical case, of a doctor dumping a long-standing patient in order to 
treat a new one with marginally greater needs. Utilitarians could easily 
judge there to be nothing wrong with that, Kantians would likely deem 
it to be wrong because of a broken promise, while adherents to the 
Afro-communal ethic would judge it wrong because long and strong 
bonds incur obligations to provide extra aid to intimates, even when 
strangers are somewhat worse off. The Afro-communal ethic’s expla-
nations merit serious consideration as rivals to familiar western ones.
There is much more that could be said to clarify and motivate 
this African ethic. For instance, is it right to be discordant or 
anti-social towards an out-group if doing so is expected to fos-
ter communal relationship amongst one’s in-group? Are human 
persons the only others with whom one should commune, or 
should one also strive to do so with imperceptible agents, such 
as the living-dead or the not-yet-born? How do human babies 
and severely mentally incapacitated adults figure in? Such 
questions deserve answers, but I do not need to provide them 
here in order to draw some reasonably firm conclusions about 
the implications of the present form of Afro-communalism for 
social distancing.
3  | HOW TO RESOLVE THE TENSION
In this section I address three different ways one might seek to re-
solve the prima facie tension that exists between the practice of 
social distancing and an ethic of cohesion, which is now specified 
 27On which see Appiah, A. (1998). Ethical Systems, African. In Craig, E. (Ed.), Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://www.rep.routl edge.
com/artic les/thema tic/ethic al-syste ms-afric an/v-1
 28See, e.g., Wiredu, op. cit. note 16, 199-200; and Gyekye, op. cit. note 1, 2010, sec. 6.
 29See Metz, op. cit. note 8.
 30For some more thorough and also wide-ranging applications than what is sketched 
here, see Metz, T. (2010). African and Western Moral Theories in a Bioethical Context. 
Developing World Bioethics, 10, 49-58; Metz, T. (2017). Ancillary Care Obligations in Light 
of an African Bioethic. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 38, 111-126; Metz, T. (2018). A 
Bioethic of Communion. In Soniewicka, M. (Ed.), The Ethics of Reproductive Genetics. 
Cham: Springer, 49-66; Metz, T. (2018). Addiction in the Light of African Values. Monash 
Bioethics Review, 36, 36-53; Metz, op. cit. note 13.
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in terms of the Afro-communal ethic (from section 2). I argue that 
two of the strategies are tempting but do not work, while contend-
ing that another strategy is much more promising. I conclude that 
cases of social distancing, when done to protect others from severe 
incapacitation or harm, are consistent with the idea that one’s basic 
aim in life should be to honour (people’s capacity for) communal 
relationships.
3.1 | The weak identity strategy
According to the Afro-communal ethic there are two distinct ways a 
moral agent ought to relate, by identifying with others and exhibiting 
solidarity with them. Now, the tension with social distancing arises 
solely from the identity condition. There is no prima facie incoher-
ence in the thought that one could benefit others from afar, with 
recent titles such as “Solidarity in a Time of Social Distancing” or 
“Social Distancing Is Solidarity” making perfect sense.31 One strat-
egy for seeking to resolve the tension would therefore be to weaken 
the identity condition.
The most extreme option would be to remove the identity 
condition altogether, and thereby to advance a purely welfarist or 
care-based account of communalism. Less extreme would be to 
retain the identity condition but to ascribe lexical priority to the 
solidarity condition, such that any amount of sympathy and aid 
to another, no matter how small, morally outweighs any amount 
of sense of togetherness and cooperation with her, no matter 
how large. In that case, helping people by withdrawing from their 
presence would also be straightforwardly prescribed. The same 
implication might obtain by a still more moderate approach of as-
signing a greater cardinal weight to solidarity than to identity, such 
that, say, a given degree of sympathy and aid to another is morally 
worth three times the comparable degree of sense of together-
ness and cooperation with her.
Although these moves would indeed ground an ethic that is 
consistent with social distancing, they must be well motivated 
as opposed to ad hoc. One prima facie reason for thinking that 
they are indeed well motivated is that they would neatly avoid ob-
jections pertaining to traditionalism. If substantial moral weight 
were ascribed to sharing a way of life, then it would apparently 
be wrong to change long-standing cultural practices even when 
they are harmful. Clitoridectomy and other patriarchal ways of life 
would seem to be justified by a strong identity condition; weak-
ening it easily solves that problem, providing independent reason 
to do so.
In reply, I maintain that both the Africanness and the plausibility 
of a communal ethic would be undermined if one did not ascribe com-
parable weights to the identity and solidarity conditions. In terms of 
Africanness, it is hard to see how a purely or substantially welfarist 
ethic can make adequate sense of the widespread suspicion of both 
robust competition and large inequality. When it comes to the state, 
African philosophers tend to reject the currently widespread practice 
of competing for a majority of votes such that minorities have no or 
very little political power. Instead, by and large political theorists in the 
sub-Saharan tradition favour a consensual model that would distribute 
political power much more evenly. In the economic realm, African phi-
losophers also usually find problematic intensely competitive markets 
in which individuals aim to maximize their own benefit and minimize 
their own costs, with some accruing enormous amounts of wealth rel-
ative to others. Even if everyone would be better off in a village if one 
person amassed all the farmland and put everyone to work on it in 
exchange for a wage, for most thinkers influenced by sub-Saharan val-
ues, there would be some moral cost to such an arrangement relative 
to public ownership of the land and collective harvesting.
Now, competition and inequality in both politics and econom-
ics are often in the long run good for people, improving everyone’s 
position relative to their absence, at least when supplemented 
with protective measures targeting the worst-off (as the work of 
John Rawls suggests). Solidarity is therefore unlikely on its own 
to explain why there is something morally troubling about com-
petition and inequality from a typically African perspective. A 
plausible explanation, though, is that they flout the values of a 
sense of togetherness and cooperation. Similar remarks apply to 
the moral weight that many African philosophers have ascribed 
to rituals and customs; these, too, are implausibly exhausted by 
considerations of well-being. For instance, when many people sing 
harmoniously it can bring out painful emotions in them, and yet 
it is worth doing, plausibly for the sense of togetherness and the 
cooperative participation.
The latter point again suggests that the identity condition is 
an inherently conservative one, but, turning now to philosophical 
plausibility as opposed to the quality of being African, it need not 
be understood in that way. First off, many intuitively objection-
able traditions are wrongful because they involve subordination 
as opposed to coordination. Clitoridectomy, for instance, is wrong 
by the Afro-communal ethic I have advanced at least when minors 
are subjected to it, not giving their free and informed consent. 
Wherever there is coercion, deception, or other kinds of manip-
ulation (of innocent people), there is a loss of cooperative partic-
ipation and hence a moral cost. The relevant way to share a way 
of life is not to have it imposed, but rather to have it freely chosen 
by those party to it. Note that the relevance of free choice here is 
not autonomy, which could amount to independence from people, 
but is instead an aspect of the relational value of interdependence 
between them.
Still more, upon reflection, it is clear that the only way for a 
communal ethic to ground an objection to paternalism, patriarchy, 
and related practices is by including an identity condition of some 
kind! If solidarity were the only relevant criterion for community, 
then men could satisfy it by imposing their will on women, so long 
as the men were sympathizing with them, doing what were likely 
 31Kaufman, A. (2020, March 18). Solidarity in a Time of Social Distancing. The Huffington 
Post. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://www.huffp ost.com/entry /solid arity -coron 
avirus_n_5e715 1e1c5 b6eab 7793e 3d97; Howard Brown Health. (2020, March 25). Social 
Distancing Is Solidarity. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://howar dbrown.org/socia 
l-dista ncing -is-solid arity /
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to improve the women's quality of life, and doing it for their sake. 
As I and some feminist philosophers critical of the ethic of care 
have pointed out,32 paternalism can be caring. Only a conception 
of communion that includes genuinely sharing a way of life with 
others, viz., on even-handed terms, can do the relational job that 
Kantians normally ascribe to the individualist concept of 
autonomy.
3.2 | The thin identity strategy
For the rest of this article, I suppose that identity is no less important 
than solidarity for an attractive and African conception of communal 
relationship. Another strategy, then, might be to reconceive identity 
more thinly, in such a way that it does not involve being in the physi-
cal presence of other people.
In particular, one might point out that it is possible to participate 
with others on a cooperative basis far away from them. After all, 
American astronauts out in space are plausibly identifying with their 
NASA counterparts in Houston, and workers can and do coordinate 
their decision-making with one another through Skype, Zoom, or other 
video chat applications. It is patently possible to engage with others on 
a voluntary and trustworthy basis even if one is spatially removed from 
them. Hence, it appears that social distancing from people is consis-
tent with sharing a way of life with them, so construed.
What is missing from the revised conception of identity is the 
condition of a sense of togetherness. The revision includes the be-
havioural component of the conception of identity I support, of co-
operative participation, but excludes the psychological one, typified 
by thinking of oneself as part of a “we” as opposed to an “I” and 
taking pride and shame in others’ respective successes and failures. 
The question now is whether the revision is sufficiently both African 
and philosophically attractive.
An initial reason for thinking that it is not philosophically attrac-
tive is that the life of an astronaut is hardly ideal. There is a cost to 
her leaving the family with whom she used to live in order to orbit 
the planet. That cost is not merely to her mental health, in terms 
of feeling lonely or homesick, but also to her ethical decision-mak-
ing. An astronaut pays a moral price upon leaving a spouse, children, 
and any others who had for a long while been sharing her (earthly) 
space. Even if an astronaut continued to participate cooperatively 
with her children through radio transmissions or video chats, the 
spatial distance she has put between them is pro tanto wrong. Notice 
the pro tanto qualification—I am not to be read as suggesting that 
those with families should never become astronauts. The point is 
that in order to account for the intuition that there is some moral 
cost to becoming an astronaut––that the guilt an astronaut naturally 
feels is appropriate––one probably has to ascribe value to a sense of 
togetherness that she disrupts when departing and prevents when 
remaining away. Astronauts leave their families, not merely spatially, 
but also relationally.
Similarly, there would be some moral cost for a manager to elect to 
have his workers engage with each other online instead of in person. 
Of course, sometimes it would be impractical for employees working 
on a project to meet, say, if they are spread out across the globe. In 
addition, I readily acknowledge the savings to time and benefits to 
the environment that would often come in the wake of working from 
home instead of driving to a firm in the same city. The point, again, is 
that there would be something morally undesirable about separating 
workers in this way, even if doing so were justified on balance.
To see that, suppose the workers lived in the same suburb and 
could all walk five or ten minutes to get to the company. If, in those 
circumstances, a manager did not have people meet in person, he 
would be doing them a disservice. That would be true, not merely 
because teamwork would be enhanced by people enjoying a sense 
of togetherness, but also because that sense of togetherness merits 
pursuit as an end and would be adequately fostered only if people 
were to shake hands, have meals together, pick up the subtleties of 
each other’s body language, and avoid the stilted communication 
typical of online conversations.
I submit that a sense of togetherness is a quintessentially African 
value, so that a conception of communal relationship without it would 
be substantially less African than one with it. “Ubuntu’s idea of leader-
ship practice is centred around the leader as a cohesive force within 
the group, one who brings people together”.33 My suggestion is that 
this familiar claim is to be taken literally; if, as this author continues, 
the point is “developing a sense of community and belonging”,34 that 
would be much more forthcoming were people to interact without 
electronic mediation. Returning to earlier examples, a large part of the 
value of rituals and customs, which many African philosophers believe 
have moral significance, is the sense of togetherness they foster. In 
addition, the common practice of collective harvesting is attractive in 
part because of the sense of togetherness involved, as opposed to one 
feeling left on one’s own.
In sum, while I accept that some of an attractive identity condi-
tion can be realized without people being in one another’s presence, 
I deny that all of it can be. Part of what is valuable about identifying 
with others or sharing a way of life with them, intuitively for many 
readers but especially for those from an African culture, is people 
feeling like insiders, members, teammates, colleagues, friends. And, 
so, the tension between an Afro-communal ethic and social distanc-
ing remains, for social distancing is plainly incompatible with culti-
vating such a feeling.
3.3 | The protection strategy
Instead of considering identity to be of much less importance than 
solidarity (3.1), or cutting the psychological dimension out of identity 
 32Metz, op. cit. note 20. See this text for citations to others.
 33Rosa, C. (2009). From Dictatorial to Consultation and Participation – The Ubuntu Way. 
In van Aswegen, S. et al. (Eds), Fresh Perspectives: Human Resource Management. Cape 
Town: Pearson South Africa, 302.
 34Ibid.
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(3.2), let us accept, for the rest of this article, that all parts of the 
conception of communal relationship advanced above (in section 2) 
have a comparable degree of moral importance. Although a robust 
identity condition is responsible for the prima facie tension between 
social distancing and prizing community, I believe the tension can 
be resolved, upon some further reflection. There is no disrespect of 
communal relationship or the people capable of it, if one infringes 
some communion as necessary to prevent a much greater loss of it. I 
call this the “protection” strategy.
A familiar analogy with the protection strategy in western 
moral and political philosophy is John Rawls’ claim that infringing 
a liberty is just if and only if essential to protect a more import-
ant liberty from violation.35 “The limitation of liberty is justified 
only when it is necessary for liberty itself, to prevent an invasion 
of freedom that would be still worse”.36 One of Rawls’ examples 
is the intuitive permissibility of constraining the liberty of reli-
gious practice as required to protect public order and security, 
where “the maintenance of public order is understood as a nec-
essary condition for everyone’s achieving his ends whatever they 
are”.37
One way to interpret the deep ethics of Rawls here is in terms 
of the principle that it does not degrade people’s capacity to set 
ends if one restricts some of their ends so as to prevent a greater 
restriction of them. It would treat people’s end pursuit as less than 
the most important value if it were traded off for the sake of some 
other perceived good such as happiness, piety, or racial purity. In 
contrast, constraining end pursuit for the sake of a more robust end 
pursuit can still amount to treating it as a superlative non-instrumen-
tal value.
There are two distinctions worth drawing, here. The first is 
whether one may infringe a liberty (or restrict the pursuit of an end) 
if necessary to prevent the infringement of any larger liberty or only 
a substantially larger liberty (end pursuit). Fellow deontologists will 
be most comfortable with the latter interpretation, which avoids a 
strict minimization criterion.
The second distinction concerns whether one may infringe a 
person’s liberty if and only if necessary to prevent her larger lib-
erty from being infringed or if necessary to prevent someone else’s 
larger liberty from being infringed. Nearly all deontologists will be 
comfortable with the former on at least some occasions, agreeing 
that it would be permissible to shove someone out of the way of 
an oncoming bus, if that were the only way to prevent her from 
getting hit by it. In addition, nearly all, even including many liber-
tarians, accept that minor infringements can be rightly imposed 
on some if essential to protect others from substantially greater 
infringements, e.g., it is permissible for the state to tax the rich 
in order to protect everyone from domestic crime and foreign 
invasion.
Now, let us replace liberty with community, so to speak. I pro-
pose the principle that where communal relationship is infringed for 
the sake of protecting a much greater degree of communal relation-
ship, it is justified––and precisely on grounds of respect for it. One 
is rightly anti-social towards others, at least to a minor or moderate 
degree, if essential to prevent a substantially larger anti-sociality. 
By this principle, there are two distinct respects in which the Afro-
communal ethic plausibly prescribes social distancing as a way to 
combat the effects of COVID-19.
Firstly, there is the straightforward idea that identity and soli-
darity, the two parts of communion, can sometimes pull in different 
directions, and that sacrificing the former for the sake of the lat-
ter could be a way of respecting communion in certain situations. 
In particular, if solidarity would be greatly undermined by a failure 
to social distance, as is plausibly the case with the coronavirus, and 
if social distancing would infringe identity to merely a moderate de-
gree, then considerations of communal relationship themselves can 
justify social distancing. The case is broadly similar to one in which a 
long-standing, voluntary cultural practice has been severely harmful 
to people, say, that of human sacrifice. Since, for all we can tell, kill-
ing innocent people did not in fact serve the function of appeasing 
the gods, considerations of communion entail that the practice was 
right to challenge and overturn, even if everyone had been accepting 
of it for a long while.
Secondly, and more interestingly, there is the idea that the iden-
tity condition on its own is sufficient to make sense of why engaging 
in social distancing is justified. Doing so would often amount to a 
minor to moderate infringement of identity for the sake of prevent-
ing a much greater infringement of it. Removing yourself from the 
space of others is, as discussed above (3.2), likely to reduce a sense 
of togetherness with them, and doing so could also reduce partic-
ipative cooperation to some notable degree if electronic means of 
communication were poor. However, passing on SARS-CoV-2 to oth-
ers would threaten them with death, long-term impaired lung func-
tion, and severe ill-health for some weeks, all respects in which you 
could not identify with them and they could not identify with you or 
indeed anyone else. Not much of a sense of togetherness and par-
ticipative cooperation are forthcoming from a person in ICU hooked 
up to a ventilator, after all. It follows that, since engaging in social 
distancing is essential to prevent such outcomes, considerations of 
identity on their own can justify it. Although a robust identity con-
dition has appeared responsible for the tension between an ethic of 
social cohesion and a practice of social distancing, one now sees that 
it in fact helps to explain why this ethic prescribes that practice in 
the context of the coronavirus.
I believe the logic of this argumentative strategy entails that social 
distancing need not be wrong at all, which is stronger than the claim 
that social distancing is always wrong to some degree but is often all 
things considered justified. Recall the liberty cases—it does not appear 
wrong to any degree to constrain religious practice as essential to 
maintain public security, to shove someone to prevent her from get-
ting hit by a bus, or to tax the super rich if necessary to prevent serious 
aggression in society. Supposing that the communal reinterpretation 
 35Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 179, 186-188, 200-202, 212-213, 220.
 36Ibid, 188.
 37Ibid, 187.
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of Rawls’ approach is indeed analogous, as it appears to be, it likely has 
similar implications. There appears to be nothing wrong with practising 
social distancing when necessary to prevent other people from catch-
ing SARS-CoV-2, even given an ethic of social cohesion.
However, one reason for thinking that there is in fact something 
wrong with social distancing is that it can be natural to apologize for 
doing so. Were I to become infected with SARS-CoV-2, it would feel 
right to say to my sons, “I’m sorry, boys, but I can’t look after you for 
a while, and need to stay in my room. It’s for your own good, and not 
because I don’t want to be close to you. I wish I could play with you, 
but I can’t right now”. This statement is plausibly reinterpreted as say-
ing, “I am wronging you to some degree by removing myself from your 
presence, but I would otherwise wrong you to a much greater degree”.
In reply, I grant that there would plausibly be reason to apologize in 
the case of disrupting an extant bond, such as with one’s children, but I 
submit that there would be no reason to apologize in the case of failing 
to form a bond in the first place. Having lived with my sons for many 
years, they reasonably expect me to be there for them. When I remove 
myself from their presence, I am infringing that reasonable expectation. 
Notice the difference between that sort of context and one in which I 
simply stop opening myself to forming bonds. I do not owe the world 
any apology when I hole up in my apartment to prevent the spread of 
SARS-CoV-2 to strangers, even though I am thereby being anti-social to-
wards them in a certain respect. So, in some cases it is not wrong at all 
to engage in social distancing, while in others it might be wrong to some 
degree but is all things considered justified by communal considerations.
3.4 | Further reflections on the protection strategy
So far I have argued that respect for people as communal beings sup-
ports the principle that one can treat others in somewhat anti-social 
ways if necessary to prevent a much greater anti-sociality towards them. 
In this section I consider some related cases, ones in which it becomes 
important to invoke the distinction between right action and good char-
acter (personhood) much more rigorously than I have done up to now.
Think, first, about a scenario in which a person engages in social 
distancing from certain people, but not for their sake. What to say 
about this scenario depends on two things, namely, how the action 
would affect others and why the person is performing it. To be more 
specific, then, suppose a person engages in social distancing from oth-
ers because they are of a certain ethnicity. Suppose, further, though, 
that doing so would in fact be what protects them from getting in-
fected, even though that is not the person’s motivation. I maintain that 
this person would be performing a right act, but would evince bad 
character in the course of doing so. The person’s action would be jus-
tified because it would be wrong to risk others suffering from COVID-
19 when one could avoid doing so with ease, but his attitude would be 
undesirable for failing to be moved by that consideration and for in-
stead being moved by a discriminatory outlook.38
For a second case, suppose a person engages in social distancing 
from strangers, not for the sake of their health, but rather for her own. 
We know from my response to the previous case that I believe the 
action would be morally right, when social distancing would be neces-
sary to protect the strangers from getting infected. However, would 
the person manifest vice, according to the Afro-communal ethic? 
Much depends on precisely why she is seeking to protect herself from 
getting infected. If she is trying to remain healthy so as to be able to 
raise her children to adulthood, then she is displaying good charac-
ter.39 However, consider the case in which she engages in social dis-
tancing from others merely for self-interested, short-term motives, 
e.g., of not wanting to experience the physical pain that would result 
from infection. Then the ethic probably entails that she would be lack-
ing personhood or virtue, or possibly evincing vice, to some degree.
That last implication will be counterintuitive to some readers, but 
probably not to those steeped in African cultures. Recall the maxims 
widely used to capture sub-Saharan morality, “I am because we are” 
and “A person is a person through other persons”––and notice that 
they are on the face of it purely other-regarding. For much of the 
African ethical tradition, the only way to realize oneself or become a 
real person is by communing with others, where failing to do for 
self-regarding reasons would be a failure to accord others their moral 
due. The point is explicit in the work of Kwame Gyekye, who denies 
that there is an ethical category of supererogation,40 and also implicit 
in that of Kwasi Wiredu, whose invocation of the Golden Rule entails 
something similar.41 These are two of the most influential African mor-
al-political philosophers of the past 20 years, with their views having 
been taken most seriously by the field. Although I would not want to 
say that an ethic is downright unAfrican if it places limits on one’s ob-
ligations to others, it seems clear that an ethic is more African for in-
cluding the view that the interests of others are alone what matter 
when it comes to becoming a real person.
For a final case to consider, return to the situation in which I isolate 
myself from my sons and doing so appears essential to prevent them 
from getting infected. I clearly do no wrong or, at the very least, no 
wrong all things considered. In addition, I clearly evince no vice, if my 
motivation for isolating myself is to protect them as opposed to, say, 
have more time to play chess online. It might nonetheless be the case 
that it would be appropriate for me to feel some guilt or shame, for 
displaying less virtue than would be desirable. In the ideal scenario I 
would continue to look after my sons, and not distance myself from 
them. Although I do only right by them upon isolating myself, I arguably 
have something to regret about this action that unluckily has been 
forced upon me. This case is similar to survivor’s guilt, in which a person 
has survived when others with whom she had associated have not and 
for reasons of dumb luck. Part of the explanation for survivor’s guilt is 
the sense that one simply did not rescue one’s associates, regardless of 
 38In this I broadly follow the approach to intention found in Thomson, J.J. (1999). 
Physician-Assisted Suicide. Ethics, 109, 497-518.
 39Cf. an African approach to “options” not to promote the good in Molefe, M. (2019). An 
African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 
93-116.
 40Gyekye, op. cit. note 1, 1997, 66-68, 71-73.
 41Wiredu, op. cit. note 16, 198.
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the fact that one could not have. Although one did not wrong those 
who perished, guilt comes in the wake of just not having prevented 
them from perishing, that is, for not having been able to be as good a 
person as would have been desirable.42 Something analogous might go 
for distancing oneself from family for all and only the right reasons.
4  | CONCLUSION: E X TENDING THE 
ANALYSIS BE YOND PERSONS
My project here has been to consider what an ethic of social cohesion 
entails for social distancing, and I have argued that an attractive Afro-
communal morality can in fact justify social distancing. There need be 
nothing degrading of others’ communal nature when we are anti-social, 
say, isolating ourselves at home, so as to prevent a significantly larger 
anti-sociality, e.g., other people dying or becoming severely ill. Of most 
interest, I contended that, despite initial appearances, it is possible to 
honour the value of sharing a way of life with others in the course of 
distancing oneself from them—when sharing a way of life with them 
would be much less possible upon not distancing. I conclude this ar-
ticle by considering how one might apply this argumentative strategy 
to cases beyond the coronavirus and even pandemics more generally.
In particular, I note that it is worth thinking about what this ratio-
nale might entail for how to relate to wild animals. Just as there is on 
the face of it a tension between an ethic of social cohesion and a 
practice of social distancing, so there is between such an ethic and a 
practice of letting animals remain in the wild. A comprehensive mo-
rality must provide an account of how to interact with not just per-
sons, but all existing beings. That is not meant to suggest that all 
beings have a moral status, only that an ethic must tell us, of all ex-
isting beings, which ones have a moral status, how much of a moral 
status they have, and how we are to treat them. It follows that an 
ethic of cohesion or an Afro-communal moral theory should provide 
guidance about how to interact with animals. Supposing that it 
would be grossly counterintuitive not to ascribe moral status to any 
animals,43 such an ethic should be read as entailing that we have di-
rect duties to at least some animals and, furthermore, that these du-
ties would have us come closer to animals and live together with 
them. More specifically, we appear to have duties of some weight to 
identify with and exhibit solidarity towards animals capable of being 
related to in that way, such as elephants and wolves (not so much 
insects and bacteria). That, in turn, appears to permit, if not require, 
domestication, amongst other ways of integrating our lives with ani-
mals, such as routinely entering what had been wild spaces. Some 
might find such an implication troubling.44
The issues are complicated and cannot be thoroughly addressed 
here. I raise them mainly to note that one central strategy to consider 
is the core principle I used when thinking about social distancing in 
respect of the coronarvirus. Specifically, does it make sense to avoid 
identifying with wild animals in order to facilitate a much greater 
identity with them? It appears not, if the relevant identificatory rela-
tion is between animals and us and not between animals themselves.
Would it make sense to avoid identifying with wild animals to fa-
cilitate a much greater solidarity with them? That is more promising 
on the face of it. Where fostering a sense of togetherness with ani-
mals and interacting on a trusting basis would nonetheless mean real 
harm to them, such as causing them anxiety, considerations of com-
munal relationship can plausibly entail that we should leave them 
in the wild. Here the case appears analogous to social distancing in 
order to prevent the reduced quality of life that would come from 
the spread of SARS-CoV-2 to other human persons.
However, what about those situations in which identifying with 
animals would not seriously reduce their quality of life? Would it in-
deed follow from the Afro-communal ethic that one should domes-
ticate or otherwise commune with them? Under those conditions, 
would that really be wrong? There is wide room for further reflection 
about the implications of an ethic of social cohesion.
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